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THE DUTY TO RESPECT GENERALLY ACCEPTED
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
BERNARD

I.

H.

OX

AN*

INTRODUCTION

Recognition of the international dimension of many environmental problems has generated increased interest in establishing international environmental regulatory regimes,
some regional, some universal.' This increased environmental awareness has focused renewed attention on the classic
obstacles to the creation of effective international regulatory
regimes, especially universal regimes, posed by the existing
international political and legal order. Those obstades have
yielded to creative political and legal solutions in the past,
and will doubtless continue to do so. The purpose of this
article is to analyze a modest supplementary tool that can be
used in conjunction with other tools to deal with one of the
significant legal obstacles, namely the consensual basis of international law.
In some circumstances the achievement of an underlying environmental or safety objective is dependent upon, or
would be enhanced by, implementation of substantially the
same environmental or safety restraints by all or an indeterminate number of states in a timely manner. Activities in
common spaces open to all, like the high seas, present the
dassic setting in which this need may arise. We now know
that activities within national territory may have detrimental
effects not only on the oceans but on the global atmosphere
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks are

due to my colleagues Thomas Clingan, Stephen Schnably and Richard
Williamson for their helpful comments, and to my indefatigable research
assistant, Clay Shuett, for his many contributions.
1. The author had the privilege of participating in meetings and conversations under the auspices of Elliot Richardson, designed to analyze
goals and approaches for the international conference on the environment
to be held in Brazil in 1992 and similar efforts. Ambassador Richardson's
paper contains very useful insights about alternative approaches to global
environmental regimes. It also suggests that a duty to respect generally
accepted international standards be included.
109
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and climate. Such activities also may be prime candidates for
universal restraints.
I first examine the various regulatory goals that these
situations may suggest, namely universality, regulatory precision, adaptability to change, and a legal obligation to comply. I then explore the difficulties posed by traditional
means for imposing new obligations that satisfy such goals:
treaties specifying the desired norms, treaties establishing a
system of regulation or "tacit amendment" to promulgate legally binding norms, and customary international law. One
problem with either treaty option is that, at best, there are
almost always gaps or "stragglers": states that are not
bound by the relevant treaty. A "soft law" 2 approach to regulation of course does not in itself create any legal obligations. Customary international law, although universal, is
not well suited to create rapid new obligations to impose detailed regulatory restraints.
I will then examine the history, use, and utility of a legal
tool that may be of supplemental help in dealing with this
problem, namely a general legal duty to respect and apply
specific types of international standards that come to be
"generally accepted." One of the virtues of this approach is
that it emphasizes the fact of general acceptance of a standard after promulgation, rather than the legal obligation (if
any) created by its initial adoption by an international organization or conference. This approach can take some pressure off the complex issues of voting procedures and enforcement concerns which accompany attempts to create institutions with legally binding regulatory power. It also
means that "soft law" recommendations need not remain
"soft."

Finally, I will conclude with some observations on the
scope of the duty to respect generally accepted international
standards and its relationship with customary international
law. The reader is cautioned that the tool is a modest one; it
should be interpreted and applied prudently if it is to remain
useful and available.
2. "Soft law" is said to emerge from instruments that do not create
enforceable rights and duties, but rather reflect underlying principles or
values in international law. See Baxter, 29 Irrr'L& CoMP. L. Q 549 (1980).
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II.

THE REGULATORY PROBLEM

A.

Objectives

Regulatory regimes are tools. No particular type of regime is a priori best suited to further specific goals. Do we
need or desire a universal regime as opposed to a regime

with more limited regional or functional participation? s Do
we prefer precise and detailed rules to broad principles? Is
the capacity for rapid adaptation to new information and cirof legally binding obcumstances important? Is the creation
4
ligations a significant objective?

A global duty to respect specific types of international
standards suggests particular regulatory objectives. To better understand the scope and utility of the duty, it is useful to
examine each of these regulatory objectives. The duty could
be employed most appropriately in contexts where these
objectives are important.
1.

Universality

An objective need for universal enforcement of a standard is most likely to arise when: 1) achieving a particular
safety or environmental goal is dependent on respect for the
standard by all or nearly all persons conducting relevant activities; and 2) enforcementjurisdiction and practical control
over those persons are effectively partitioned among a large
or indeterminate number of different states.
Geography is often a major factor in making this determination. The object of regulation may be activities in areas
outside any state's territorial jurisdiction, where nationals of
all states have a right to conduct activities essentially under
3. This question may arise even with respect to the high seas, which
are open to all. Partidpation in conservation arrangements concerning
particular areas or resources is typically confined to states with direct interests: coastal states in the area and those states whose nationals arc engaged in fishing for the relevant resources. See U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982), U.N. GAOR, 1 th Sess., arts. 63(2). 64-67, 116-18,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983); 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
4. At some point interesting questions might be asked about the utility of characterizing as a "regime" a body of norms that is not treated at
least de facto as binding. The English and French languages are rich
enough to supply a different word whose etymology is less closely assodated with concepts of rules, governance, and restraint.
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the exclusive control of the "flag" state of the craft or expedition in question. Alternatively, the object of regulation
may be activities occurring in the territory of an indeterminate number of states that affect a common value such as the
marine environment, the atmosphere, or the climate.
Economics may also be an important determinative factor. While immediate self-interest may be concentrated
enough to ensure widespread compliance with certain types
of safety rules designed primarily to benefit those con-

ducting the regulated activities (for example, "rules of the
road" to prevent collisions), the benefits of compliance with
many types of environmental restraints are widely dispersed.
A situation in which some, or even most, of those conducting
a particular activity observe inconvenient or expensive environmental restraints while others do not, poses the classic
problem of what economists sometimes call the "free
rider." 5 The capacity to establish or to maintain particular
regulatory restraints may be enhanced by the ability to
demonstrate that the "free rider" problem is not likely to be
significant and, should it arise, could be dealt with.
2.

Precision

Many safety and environmental regulations for which
one seeks universal compliance are quite precise and detailed. "Rules of the road" must prescribe precise reactions
by at least two different actors to any number of specific circumstances if collisions are to be avoided. In the maritime
area alone, there are precise and detailed international regulations regarding training, expertise of personnel, construction, facilities, equipment, discharges, and a host of other
matters. The difficulty of "enacting" all such detailed regulations as universally binding positive law suggests a need for
additional legal approaches.
5. This "free rider" problem may lead to what has been described as
the "tragedy of the commons," a situation in which effective regulation
becomes impossible. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCiENCE
1243 (1968). But see Cox, No Tragedy of the Commons, 7 ENvmL ETmics 49
(1985); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Common: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 711 (1986).
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3. Adaptability
Few would dispute the need for procedures to change
certain rules relatively quickly in response to new knowledge, experience, and technology. Often the more precise
and detailed the rules, the more likely that changes will be
needed.
Environmental rules in particular must respond to an
expanding base of scientific knowledge about the natural environment, effects on that environment, and alternative strategies for furthering environmental goals. They should also
respond to advances in the economic, political, and social
sciences regarding the effectiveness and costs of alternative
strategies for influencing human behavior in order to further
environmental (or other) goals.
The ability to make future changes may also influence
the content of an initial set of rules. Willingness to experiment may well depend on the capacity to undo mistakes
quickly and efficiently.
4. Legal Obligation
The purpose of establishing a duty to respect international standards presumably is to further the other objectives
already identified in those cases where it is both reasonable
and helpful to interpose a legal obligation to observe and
enforce the standards.
While there is presumably a safety or environmental argument in favor of observing every international safety or
environmental norm, the creation of a legal obligation to do
so arms us with additional arguments to persuade those who
are not otherwise fully persuaded. In some cultures the
existence of a legal obligation may have a significant impact
on public perceptions and behavior. Also, the existence, interpretation, and application of a legal obligation are matters
that can be arbitrated or adjudicated where there is jurisdiction.
B.

Means

If these objectives are to be realized, the basic challenge
is to find means to oblige all states to impose new restraints
on their nationals. The means chosen must overcome the
obstacles to achieving fairly widespread assent to new obliga-
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tions. The problem remaining is then to close the gap be-

tween "widespread" and "universal."
1. Treaties Setting Forth the New Standards

Treaties containing new rules to be observed by the parties are the classic form of "international legislation." The

problem is -that treaties bind only their parties. Each state's
government must affirmatively accept a treaty in order to become a party. With important treaties, this may entail timeconsuming internal constitutional procedures. The same
generally holds true for changes to treaties. 6
This means of regulation therefore poses obvious

problems with respect to goals of universality as well as
timely adaptation to changed circumstances.
2.

Treaties Establishing a System to PromulgateFuture Legally
Binding Rules

The most conservative version of a second approach is
barely distinguishable from the first option. A treaty establishes an international organization, or calls for regular
meetings, for the purpose of drafting rules to be submitted
to the governments of the parties. Before a state is bound,
its government must specifically ratify or approve the rules.
This approach has most of the same problems as the first
option, although response time may be shorter at the drafting and the governmental approval stages.
The legally significant departure from the first option
occurs when one attempts to establish a system by treaty pursuant to which a state consents in advance to be bound to
apply rules adopted thereafter by an international organization or conference, even if its government has not expressly
approved those rules. This typically occurs if the rule is
adopted by a qualified majority at the international meeting
concerned, 7 or if the rule is thereafter approved by the gov6. Treaties that contain expedited amendment procedures are analyzed in the next group along with other treaties that establish regulatory
bodies or processes for promulgating new rules.
7. The nature of the qualified majority may vary substantially. Where

plenary organs of all parties are concerned, one would normally expect a
requirement of no less than a two-thirds vote for the adoption of substantive texts. Sometimes the concurring votes of specific states or groups of
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ernments of a qualified majority of parties, or both. "Tacit
amendment" procedures applicable to "technical" annexes
of regulatory treaties are one popular manifestation of this
approach.
This approach is designed to overcome the obstacles to
universality and timely adaptability inherent in the first option. However, this is achieved only after, and to the extent
that, the treaty establishing the regulatory procedure is itself
widely ratified.8 Only parties to the "constitutive" treaty are
bound by rules adopted under it.
The fact that the treaty establishing a more expedited
regulatory procedure must itself be widely ratified to achieve
the goal of universality places inherent limitations on precisely how far one may go in presenting a state with the risk
that it will be bound by a future rule which is adverse to its
interests. There is a tension between the goals of universality and adaptability.
To promote adaptability, one will seek agreement to a
procedure that requires less for the entry into force of a rule
than the affirmative assent by each state party after formal
internal constitutional review. This means that parliaments
may be asked to yield a right to review the rules before their
states become bound.9 It also means that domestic agencies
and public constituencies may be yielding to a national delegationl0 the effective right to review the rules in their final
form.
If less than unanimity or consensus is required for the
adoption of a legally binding regulation, great pressure is
states will be required. "Weighted voting" is often used in commodity
arrangements and financial organizations. Another technique is to vest
exdusive or concurrent power to adopt proposed rules in a "council" or
"commission" of limited composition designed to reflect the underlying
interests at stake.

8. Very few regulatory treaties achieve the almost universal participation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. See Con-

vention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Star. 1180,
T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
9. This may pose a particular problem in constitutional structures
where the government is not responsible to the parliamentary majority.
10. Modem electronic communications notwithstanding, this could
pose a particular problem for governments that do not have a tradition of
(and travel budgets for) strong representation and influence by domestic
agencies and public constituencies on their delegations.
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placed on the question of the composition and voting rules
of the bodies authorized to adopt a regulation. This question will be negotiated in the abstract, not in the context of a
specific rule or an existing organization with a known regulatory track record. Some participants will argue for "democratic" or "efficient" decision-making procedures by a majority or two-thirds majority. From others one will hear objections to yielding a right to consent to a rule before it
becomes binding on any given state unless that state, or
states with which it shares relevant interests, have effective
blocking power.
These obstacles can be overcome where the regulatory
procedure is designed to deal with "technical" matters that
are not deemed likely to result in rules significantly prejudicial to the interests of concerned states. But this fact creates
a tension between a substantive goal of significant regulation, on the one hand, and potential resistance to the idea of
consenting in advance to a significant (that is a potentially
significantly adverse) regulation, on the other. In general,
the greater the potential that a rule will have significant adverse impact on the economic or other interests of a state,
the more cautious a government will be about yielding to
others the authority to adopt that rule.
Thus, in general, one will find greatest adaptability
where the rules adopted will not be legally binding without
subsequent affirmative assent, or where there is a right to
"opt out" of particular rules, or where the rules adopted are
unlikely to have significant adverse impact on the economic
or other interests of states.
3.

Customary InternationalLaw

"Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."" It is evident even from this general description that there are difficulties in relying on customary
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1986)[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. This is a somewhat more accessible formulation of the idea referred to as "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" in article 38,
paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 26,
1945, art. 38, para. 1, T.S. No. 993, at 30).
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international law to achieve the relevant underlying regulatory objectives.
If one relies on evidence of actual behavior of governments to generate the relevant rules, it will be very difficult,
and often impossible, to achieve the desired measure of precision sought in many regulatory regimes. The need for authoritative written articulations of the restraints is great.
The question then becomes one of achieving widespread acceptance of essentially the same written articulation. While
this can, and doubtless does at times, occur by a process in
which states copy each other's legislation and regulations, it
is a slow, uncertain, and haphazard process that is likely to
be impaired by the absence of broader participation in the
12
drafting of the rules.
Many legal systems rely on the development of a richly
textured written case law to provide a reasonable degree of
articulate precision. It seems unlikely thatjudicial or arbitral
resolution of inter-state disputes would produce the volume
or variety of cases necessary to achieve the desired degree of
precision with respect to the matters under consideration.' 3
Perhaps more to the point, most states have themselves felt
the need to resort to detailed statutory and regulatory rules
enacted as positive law to deal with the kinds of environmental and other problems with which we are concerned in this
article.
To the extent we conclude that the international system
must likewise resort to positive written "legislation," we of
course revert to the treaty and regulatory options already
discussed. The question here, therefore, concerns some hy12. The same would hold true of attempts to adapt the rules to changing circumstances and information. This difficulty is also likely to inhibit
attempts to rely on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as an alternative source of legal obligation. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, supra note 11, art. 38, para. I (c).
13. As in the case of admiralty, it is possible for private law to develop,
through municipaljudicial decisions, roughly parallel to national rules regarding the liability of private actors who are the ultimate object of international regulatory restraints. Today, much of the law has been articulated by national legislatures as codes, comprehensive regulatory schemes,
or free-standing statutes. Moreover, many objects of regulation are much
less obviously international than are ships. Thus, the likelihood of such a
development flowering into a new and generally uniform international system of restraint must be regarded as slight.
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brid in which we rely on international conferences or organizations to provide the written articulation of the rules but
rely on customary law, in whole or in part, to supply the universal legal obligation to comply. One model uses the treaty
or regulatory option outlined above to achieve as much express acceptance of binding rules as possible, and then relies
on customary law to fill in the gaps. The other uses an international organization to articulate the rules in a resolution
that does not in itself have binding effect, and then relies entirely on customary law to supply the universal legal obligation.
Both models have been central to the development of
modern international law. So-called law-making treaties and
declarations of principles adopted by the U.N. General Assembly are classic examples of instruments that can be, and
regarded as generally declarawhen appropriate have been,
14
law.
international
of
tory
One example of this process arises when it can be
demonstrated that the drafters of the provision, themselves
expert in international law, believed the provision to be declaratory of existing or emerging international law, particularly if this belief was shared by a wide range of government
delegations. In that case, it might be asserted that the provision was declaratory of customary international law when
adopted. This kind of argument will not normally be available in the case of most detailed environmental and other
regulatory measures. The purpose of such measures is not
only, or even mainly, to articulate existing or emerging customary restraints on governments, but to provide new (and
updated) detailed regulatory guidance for restraining specific activity, much of it private.
The more pertinent example arises when it can be
demonstrated that the relevant provisions of the instrument,
although not declaratory of international law when adopted
14. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948)(adopted by G.A. on Dec. 10, 1948); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/

8028 (1970).
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by the international organization or conference, have since
been absorbed into customary international law. The International Court of Justice articulated several requirements
with respect to treaty provisions in the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases:15
1) "the provision concerned should, at all events
potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating
character such as could be regarded as forming
the basis of a general rule of law .... ,,16
2) there should be "very widespread and representative participation" in the treaty containing the
relevant provision, including "that of States
whose interests were specially affected ....-17
3) within the time period since adoption and entry
into force of the treaty containing the relevant
provision, "short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
provision invoked; and should moreover have
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is
involved ... ."I
The substantive heart of many regulatory treaties is to
be found in extremely technical annexes, some of which may
be incomprehensible to a generalist. It is open to doubt
whether all, or even many, of these "could be regarded as
forming the basis of a general rule of law" for purposes of
the first requirement.' 9
The second and third requirements might be regarded
as complementary. The second requirement deals with very
15. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.CJ. 4 (Feb. 20).
16. Id. para. 72.
17. Id.para. 73.
18. Id para. 74.
19. Ma2
para. 72. One could of course take the position that the general
rule is to be found in a treaty provision requiring states to observe and
enforce the detailed rules contained in the same treaty. In that case, in
order to establish state practice with respect to the general rule, one might
have to demonstrate that all of the details have been extensively and uniformly applied, not merely the specific ones in question.
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widespread and representative ratification of a treaty, including that of states whose interests are specially affected, while
the third deals with extensive and virtually uniform state
practice, again including that of states whose interests are
specially affected.
One can identify four important quantitative and qualitative elements of the requisite "state practice": the provision must be accepted by states, whether by treaty ratification, national legislation, or authoritative governmental pronouncement; 20 acceptance by states must be very widespread
or extensive; the states accepting the provision must be representative; and the states accepting the provision must include the states whose interests are specially affected.
Assuming there is sufficient state practice (for example,
extensive uniformity in national legislation on the subject), it
must occur in a way that shows a general recognition that an
international legal obligation is involved. It is unlikely to
prove easy to satisfy this opinio juris requirement. Relative
uniformity may emerge for a variety of substantive and policy reasons having nothing to do with a sense of legal obligation. Even a belief that uniformity with respect to the provision in question is sound international policy is not the same
as a belief that uniformity is legally required.
So-called law-making treaties and declarations of legal
principles adopted by international organizations, even if
they are not regarded in whole or in part as lex lata or authoritative statements of what international law is, are usually regarded as lexferenda or statements by the "authors" of what
international law should be. Technical regulatory provisions
in environmental and other treaties and resolutions rarely
share these qualities. Their purpose is neither the codification nor the progressive development of international law as
such. This makes it more difficult to say that implementation
by a state of the requirements imposed by such provisions
arises out of a sense of legal obligation (except of course
where the state is bound by treaty to do so).
20. International regulations may be applied by private companies
prior to or in the absence of formal entry into force or implementation by
the state concerned. Such practice by private entities would presumably
be an insufficient basis for establishing a customary law obligation of
states.
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Even if all of these requirements are satisfied, there remains the problem of the so-called "persistent objector." A
state may be able to avoid being bound by a new rule of cusopposed the rule while state
tomary law if it consistently
21
practice was still emerging.
In sum, while a hybrid "legislative/customary law" approach has had some success in areas such as human rights,
the law of the sea, and the law of treaties, that approach
poses formidable obstacles to the creation of universal legal
obligations even in traditional fields of international law.
Those obstacles would be more difficult to surmount in the
context of detailed technical regulation of private activities
for environmental or other purposes.
For example, experienced mariners may know that
green means starboard, but does that make it a rule of customary international law that states are obliged to enforce?
One is more likely to reach that result through the intermediation of a more general rule of conventional or customary
international law that incorporates the maritime custom. It
is this intermediate rule that is the subject of this artide.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF

A

DUTY

TO RESPECT GENERALLY

ACCEPTED STANDARDS AT SEA

A duty to respect generally accepted international standards was developed in the course of efforts sponsored by
the United Nations to provide for the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea. The duty was
first articulated by the International Law Commission and
the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, largely in view
of the need to ensure universal adherence to certain "rules
of the road" and safety requirements on the high seas. The
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea substantially
expanded the range of situations in which the duty is applied, notably with respect to environmental matters.

21. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266, 277-78 (refusal by
Peru to ratify convention concerning diplomatic asylum); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.CJ. 116, 131 (refusal by Norway to adhere to fisheries zone).
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The 1958 Convention on the High Seas

In 1950, the International Law Commission began work
on the international law of the sea. By 1956 it had completed a set of draft articles which became the basis for the
work of the Conference on the Law of the Sea convened by
the United Nations in Geneva in 1958.22 The Conference
made some changes in the articles submitted, and divided
them into four separate conventions on the law of the sea.
1. Article 10
The Convention on the High Seas 2 3 is the only one of
the four conventions adopted at the 1958 Conference to
state in its preamble that its purpose is "to codify the rules of
international law" and that the Conference adopted its provisions "as generally declaratory of established principles of
international law." It is therefore particularly interesting
that article 10, paragraph 2, contains an idea that does not
appear to have been articulated as a principle of international law prior to work on the Convention, at least not in
that form.
Article 10 provides:
1. Every State shall take such measures for ships
under its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at
sea with regard inter alia to:
(a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions;
(b) The manning of ships and labour conditions
for crews taking into account the applicable
international labour instruments;
(c) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships.
2. In taking such measures each State is required to
conform to generally accepted international
standards and to take any steps which may be
24
necessary to ensure their observance.
22. See U.N. GAOR, 1Ith Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159.
23. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
24. Id., art. 10.
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Negotiating the Background of Artide 10

Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas finds its
origin in the need for universal observance of what Manley
Hudson styled "the maritime rules of the road." 2 5 During
the 1950 session of the International Law Commission, Hudson stated that "[h]e hoped that the Rapporteur would be
able.., to educe from existing rules a principle which the
Commission could discuss... with a view to its insertion in a
draft code." 26 Hudson later observed that "he knew of no
other case of a subject of such great international significance being left to a concordance of municipal laws instead
of being regulated by international convention." 2 7 He was
alluding to the fact that international "maritime rules of the
road," while in existence since 1863, and revised in 1889,
1929, and 1948, "were not in the nature of international
their international application was not
conventions, 2 and
8
compulsory."
Spiropoulos replied that he "thought it his duty to point
25. Report of the 64th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 193, 194,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950. The general problem was outlined in
Section III of the Secretariat Memorandum commonly attributed to Professor Gidel, which condudes, "il est indispensable. dans certaines mati~res au moins, qu'il y ait une rigoureuse unit6 dans la rfglementation
adopt6e: r~gles de route, feux, signaux entre navires, etc. Mime pour les
matitres r6glement6es qui, par leur nature, ne requiirent point idenitE
absolue de r6glementation, une r6glementation uniforme sera toujours
souhaitable." Mbmorandum pr6sentieparle Secrtariat, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L
Comm'n 67, 75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. I.
Manley Hudson was a member of the International Law Commission
that drafted the above text.
26. Report of the 64th Meeting, supra note 25, at 193-94.
27. Id.

28. Id. For example, as Special Rapporteur Frangois subsequently reported, the 1948 London Maritime Conference "decided not to annex the
revised [Collision] Regulations to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1948." Instead, it invited the United Kingdom to
forward the 1948 Regulations to governments that had accepted the 1929
Regulations. It also invited the United Kingdom, "when substantial unanimity has been reached as to the acceptance of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1948, to fix the date on and after
which the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
1948, shall be applied by the Governments which have agreed to accept
them." Report of the 66th Meeting, (1950] 1 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n 208, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950.
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out that the Commission did not seem to him to be prepared
for dealing with questions as technical as those raised by certain problems of navigation on the high seas and particularly
by that of the safety of human life." 2 9 No member of the
Commission suggested that the technical rules, even those
widely adopted by national governments, were part of cus30

tomary law.

Hudson subsequently identified the nub of the problem
as follows:
It could not be stated that any particular set of
rules ... should be recommended; but in order to
prevent chaos in maritime traffic it could be stated
that maritime States must bring the law applicable
to their own vessels into conformity with that applicable to the vessels of other States. Without going
so far as to codify the principles of 1948 or of 1929,
the Commission should take steps to avoid the confusion that would prevail and the dangers that
would arise if every maritime State established
whatever regulations it thought fit for its own ves1
sels.3
He suggested that recommendations should be given to
states asking them not to issue "regulations which conflicted
with regulations jointly agreed [upon] by other maritime
States." 3 2 In reflecting on Hudson's idea, Scelle noted a
"danger.... which might, however, be avoided by careful
drafting, namely, that the main maritime powers might set
'
themselves up as shipping controllers. "33
Based on this discussion, the Special Rapporteur (Fran29. Report of the 64th Meeting, supra note 25, at 194.
30. This was subsequently made explicit by Yepes with reference to the
rules adopted by the 1948 London Conference: "Those rules concerned
navigation signals and other technical points, but did not constitute principles of international law." Summary Records of the 123rd Meeting, [1951] 1
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 346. While Scelle did retort, "Regulations were just
as much a part of international law as any principle," he did not argue that
the regulations in question were a part of customary international law. Id.
at 347. Such a position would seem to be inconsistent with his other remarks. See infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
31. Summary Records of the 123rd Meeting, supra note 30, at 348.
32. Id. at 349.
33. Id. at 348.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1991]

RESPECTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

gois) proposed the following text: "A State may not issue
any regulations inconsistent with those jointly agreed upon
by the majority of maritime States, if such inconsistency
would jeopardize the safety of life at sea."3 4
Frangois noted that this text did not permit the principal
maritime powers to establish themselves as regulators.3 5
This conclusion was based in part, presumably, on the words
"majority of maritime states." This text was later criticized
by Scelle because it did not reflect a "principle of a qualified
as distinct from a simple majority."-3 6 A reference to "the
majority of vessels engaged in international seafaring" was
regarded as superior in this regard.3 7 At the same Lime,
Scelle vigorously supported retaining some reference to an
appropriate majority. He claimed that it "had the great advantage of substituting for the stultifying rule of unanimity
the effective rule of a genuine majority." 38 Scelle also had
"serious objections" to the words "jointly agreed," which
were to him totally unacceptable.3 9 "Jointly agreed" suggested that the states needed a special agreement to establish regulations, whereas they actually developed out of a series of individual decisions in the same way as customary law.
In light of the discussion, Frangois combined the texts
on safety and signals, and proposed the following:
States shall issue, for their ships, regulations concerning the use of signals and the prevention of collisions on the high seas. Such regulations must not
be inconsistent with those fixed by international
agreement and applying to the majority of sea-gowould jeopardize
ing vessels, if such inconsistency
40
the safety of life at sea.
Two issues regarding the second sentence of the proposed text were raised. First, whether the requisite majority
34. Summary Records of the 145th Afeeting, [1952] 2 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n
46, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41/SER.A/1952.
35. Id.
36. Summary Records of the 285th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n
16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Summary Records of the 294th Afeeting, 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 66-67.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955.
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should be measured in terms of tonnage rather than vessels.
It was also suggested that the expression should be qualified
even further by the word "substantial." Second, it was argued that limiting the applicable international standards to
regulations "fixed by international agreement" would be
overly restrictive. 4 1 Noting that "it was only in certain
spheres of maritime law that definite agreements existed,"
and that "in other fields certain rules had come to be generally accepted and applied," Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice proposed
substituting the words "generally accepted internationally"
for the words "fixed by international agreement. '42 He
noted that "the purpose of the article was to oblige States to
conform to generally accepted rules which ex hypothesi were
not necessarily accepted by all States. It was essential to ensure that States did not issue regulations
inconsistent with
those observed by the great majority." 43
The question of the requisite "majority" needed to trigger a universal duty to conform remained controversial. The
Commission stuck to a functional view, although it switched
from counting vessels to counting tonnage. Yugoslavia proposed that the Commission change this to a "majority of
Members of the United Nations." '44 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
opposed the Yugoslav proposal vigorously:
Countries with large fleets had already been forced
to give serious consideration to the best means for
ensuring maximum safety at sea. The methods
adopted therefore applied to a majority of vessels.
It would be regrettable if an existing and satisfactory state of affairs were to be upset by a decisionthat could not be unanimous-inspired by considerations quite remote from the essential technical re45
quirements.
The Commission decided to delete the express refer41. Id. at 67.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the TerritorialSea, [1956] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.Add.1/1956.
45. Summary of the Records of the 342nd Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 44, U.N. Sales No. 1956.V.3.V.1.
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ence to a requisite majority. 46 It also went beyond the matter of signals and collisions, adding references to other types
of regulations, 4 7 and making the specific references indicative rather than exclusive. The result was the following text
of article 34 in the 1956 Report of the Commission:
1. Every State is required to issue, for ships under
its jurisdiction, regulations to ensure safety at
sea with regard, inter alia, to:
(a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions;
(b) The crew, which must be adequate to the
needs of the ship and enjoy reasonable labour conditions;
(c) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of the ship.
2. In issuing such regulations, each State is required to observe internationally accepted stanto sedards. It shall take the necessary measures
48
regulations.
the
of
cure observance
At the 1958 Conference, the United Kingdom originally
proposed deleting the Commission's article 34 and other
regulatory provisions proposed by the Commission on the
grounds that those provisions might be inconsistent with
specific international regulatory instruments or that their
substance might be addressed by specific international marl46. Id. at 45. The Commission's report explains that "the majority of
the Commission preferred the more general expression 'internationally
accepted standards.' This expression also covers regulations which are a
product of international co-operation, without necessarily having been
confirmed by formal treaties." Report to the GeneralAssembly, (1956] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 281, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (1956).
47. Summary of the Records of the 342nd Meeting, supra note 45, at 43-44.

The additions were specifically linked to the question of "flags of convenience" in the Commission's report:
"Regulations concerning the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships, and the labour conditions of crews, can contribute much to the safety of navigation. Objections to the transfer of ships to another flag have often been accentuated by the
fact that such regulations, and an effective control over their application, were lacking in the State of the new flag."
Report to the GeneralAssembly, supra note 46, at 280.
48. Report to the GeneralAssembly, supra note 46, at 280.
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time regulatory organizations or conferences. 4 9 Frangois
was constrained to observe that the text submitted by the
Commission in fact contained no such incompatibilities.0
The very purpose of article 34 was to ensure substantive regulatory consistency.
Article 34 nevertheless raised the possibility that a state
might be bound by a standard set forth in an instrument
adopted by an international organization or conference
notwithstanding the absence of power or intent to adopt a
legally binding rule and without regard to the provisions of
the instrument regarding its entry into force. Jenks noted
this possibility of procedural inconsistency in communicating the concerns of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO):
[T]he internationally accepted standards for labour
conditions at sea were laid down in conventions and
recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference, which were not binding upon
members of the Organisation by virtue of such
adoption. Members were obliged to apply such instruments only if they had accepted them by ratification ....
Furthermore, ILO conventions did not
enter into force for ratifying members until certain
conditions were fulfilled, such as ratification by a
certain number of countries, including members
having a prescribed minimum tonnage. The International Law Commission's text might therefore be
open to objection. 5 '
The United Kingdom then made it quite clear that the
nub of its problem with paragraph 2 of article 34 was the
possible duty to apply ILO conventions that had not been
ratified by the state concerned or were not widely accepted.
It also felt paragraph 1 required legislative regulation when
the underlying objectives were achievable by other means. 5 2
49. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. GAOR 2nd Comm.,
4th mtg., at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/40, U.N. Sales No. 58.V.4 (1958)
[hereinafter Law of the Sea Conference]; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.49
at 129.
50. Law of the Sea Conference, supra note 49, at 32-33.
51. Id. at 27.
52. Id. at 51-52.
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Faced with opposition to its proposal to delete article 34
from a number of participants, including France, the Netherlands, the United States, and the Soviet Union,53 the British
delegation redrafted the text. The revised proposal incorporated the Israeli idea 4 of substituting the more flexible obligation to take measures rather than adopt regulations in the
first paragraph, and proposed substituting the words "generally accepted standards" for "internationally accepted standards" in the second paragraph. 55 A week later Britain
joined with the Netherlands to propose a new text that ultimately became article 10 of the Convention on the High
Seas. That text uses the term "generally accepted international standards" in paragraph 2.56
B.

57
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
adopted texts that significantly broaden the duty of the flag
state to apply generally accepted international standards. It
also applied the concept in new contexts. Six provisions refer to generally accepted international regulations, practices,
and procedures, 58 five to generally accepted international
rules or standards, 5 9 and three to generally accepted stan53. Id. at 51, 57-58.
54. Id. at 59-60.
55. Law of the Sea Conference, supra note 49, at 137.
56. Id. at 77, 148. While the addition of an express reference to "international labour instruments" in paragraph 1(b) would seem to be in conflict with objections stated by the British delegation and the ILO itself, one
should note that the reference is qualified by the potentially ambiguous
word "applicable," and more importantly, that the reference is qualified
by the words "taking into account." This could be read as suggesing that
while applicable international labour instruments should be taken into account by a state in adopting measures for its own ships under paragraph I,
this is to be distinguished from generally accepted international standards
with regard to labor conditions to which a state is required to conform
under paragraph 2. In other words, the express reference may weaken the
argument that the labor conventions are in and of themselves the source
of the generally accepted international standards. See MYREs S. McDouGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OcEANs 837-39
(1985).
57. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3.
58. Id., arts. 21(4), 39(2), 41(3), 53(8), 94(2), 94(5).
59. Id.arts. 21(2), 211(2), 211(5), 211(6), 226(1).
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dards. 60 Two significant environmental provisions employ
similar concepts with different language. 6 1
During the interval between the negotiation of the 1958
Conventions and the 1982 U.N. Convention, public interest
in prevention of pollution and protection of the environment
increased dramatically. This interest was reflected both in
the strong and elaborate environmental provisions of the
1982 Convention, and in the fact that such traditional concerns as safety at sea and prevention of collisions took on
2
added environmental significance. 6
1. Safety on the High Seas
Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas was retained and expanded in article 94 of the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea to provide for inspection of ships as well
as qualifications and training of the master, officers, and
crew.6 3 This change resulted from an early European proposal to retain article 10 as drafted and add a new article specifying additional matters with respect to which a state "shall
conform to generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices." 6 4 The two were subsequently
combined, with the final version of the text reading "generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices," instead of the previously worded phrase "generally
accepted international standards." 65
60. Id. art. 60, paras. 3, 5, 6.
61. Id. arts. 208(3), 210(6).
62. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 194, para. 3(b).
"[P]reventing accidents" is the first specific measure mentioned after the
first reference to minimizing pollution from vessels in Part XII of the Convention. The general provision calling for international standards to regulate pollution from ships expressly includes "routeing [sic] systems
designed to minimize the threat of accidents which might cause pollution." Id. art. 211, para. 1.
63. Id. art. 94, para. 4(c). Indeed, article 94, paragraph 4(c) specifically
requires "that the master, the officer, and to the extent appropriate, the
crew are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the prevention
of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution,
and the maintenance of communications by radio." Id.
64. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.54, 3 Off. Rec. Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea 229, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.5 (1983).

65. The history of article 94 is traced in U.N.

OFFICE FOR OCEAN AF-
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2. Pollutionfrom Ships and Related Safety Concerns
At the same time, the idea of a duty to respect international standards was being extended to the question of pollution from ships. Pursuant to recommendations of an Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm
in 1972 endorsed a principle obliging states to "ensure that
vessels under their registration comply with internationally
agreed rules and standards relating to ship design and construction, operating procedures and other relevant factors."' 6 6 This idea was ultimately incorporated in article 211,
paragraph 2, of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
in the following form:
States shall adopt laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of
the marine environment from vessels flying their
flag or of their registry. Such laws and regulations
shall at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards established through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference.
With this provision we have moved well beyond "rules
of the road" situations in which the need for uniformity
seemed objectively inescapable. 6 7 As the foregoing provision makes dear, the international environmental standards
represent a minimum obligation for the flag state; it may impose stricter constraints on its ships if it so chooses. This
constitutes part of a more general effort in the Convention to
establish that international standards represent the minimum level of environmental restraint that states must im68
pose with respect to activities at sea under their control.
FAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA, NAVIGATION ON TilE

HIGH SEAS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PART VII, SECTnON I (ARImcLES

87, 89,

90-94, 96-98) OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVErION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.89.V.2 (1989).
66. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, at 23, recommendation 92, U.N. Doc. A/C/CONF.48/14/REV.1/Corr.I, U.N. Sales
No. E.73.lI.A.14 (1974).
67. See Summary Records of the 2nd Session, [1950] 1 Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n
193-94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950.
68. The provisions of the Convention regarding the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship or
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The Convention also imposes other obligations on the
flag state or its ships. These obligations are to respect "generally accepted" international rules or standards regarding
safety or pollution in the territorial sea, 6 9 in straits and archipelagos, 70 and in the vicinity of fixed installations. 7'
3.

Pollutionfrom Seabed Activities and Ocean Dumping

Coastal state restraints on seabed activities and offshore
installations subject to the state's jurisdiction must be "no
less effective than international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures." 72 Its dumping regulations must be "no less effective... than the global rules and
73
standards."
The absence of the qualifying words "generally accepted" in these two provisions suggests, in strictly textual
terms, that the underlying idea may not be precisely the
same.7 4 However, careful interpretation of the provisions
other government non-commercial ship or aircraft, but states are required
to ensure that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent with the
Convention so far as is reasonable and practicable. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 236.
69. Id. art. 21, para. 4.
70. Id. art. 39, para. 2; id. at 22, art. 54.
71. Id. art. 60, para. 6.
72. Id. art. 208, para. 3. It was contemplated that international environmental regulations for seabed mining beyond the limits of coastal state
jurisdiction would be established directly under the Convention by the International Seabed Authority. See id. arts. 145, 209.
73. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 210, para. 6.
74. It cannot be assumed that the use of different words, in such a huge
Convention drafted and negotiated by so many different people in disparate groups over many years, necessarily represents an intentional decision to convey a different meaning. There was no convenient forum for
dealing with such technical problems at the Law of the Sea Conference.
Since the main committees had the authority to renegotiate substance,
delegates there usually remained silent about imperfect texts that emerged
from informal negotiations and consultations for fear of upsetting those or
other parts of the package on which a consensus was beginning to emerge.
The Conference Drafting Committee, having been precluded from dealing
with matters of substance and having been destined by its organization
into open-ended language groups to be preoccupied with problems of
concordance among different languages, was able to deal effectively with
only some of the overwhelming number of technical problems of this sort.
This was, in part, because of a procedure pursuant to which an objection
by any delegation terminated discussion of a proposal.
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will lead to much the same result.7 5
It is implausible to assume that states were (or are) significantly more willing to be bound to respect international
environmental restraints with respect to seabed activities in
their territorial seas and on their continental shelves than
with respect to their ships at sea. Most states at the Conference gave priority to their coastal resource interests. 7 6 The
obligation of the coastal state to restrain the development of
seabed resources off its coast to the extent required by environmental "rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures" it has not otherwise accepted is properly
interpreted to apply only to those which are truly "international" by virtue of their very widespread (that is general)
acceptance.7
75. The Third Restatement, while citing article 208 of the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea as authority, subjects seabed activities to a
general duty to respect "generally accepted" international standards regarding pollution of the marine environment. Rs'rA'rTimtr, supra note
11, § 603 and Comment c.
Kwiatkowska notes that the U.N. Environment Program's regional
conventions oblige state parties to ensure implementation of the "applicable" or "generally accepted" international rules and standards. BARBARA
KwirxowsKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE INTHE NEW LAW
OF THE SEA 193, n.60 (1989).
76. Parts II, III and IV of the Convention articulate no express duties

of the coastal state with respect to seabed resources in internal waters or
the territorial sea other than those arising out of the applicable regimes
for passage of ships and aircraft, and only very limited additional duties in

archipelagic waters. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 5 1. Part
VI of the Convention reveals the reluctance of coastal states to accept limitations on their exclusive right to manage the hydrocarbons and other re-

sources of the continental shelf. Pursuant to article 68, sedentary species
of the continental shelf, as a textual matter, are excluded from the obligation even to conserve living resources imposed by the regime of the exclusive economic zone. Compared with the text of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, express coastal state rights over the continental shelf
are increased with respect to geographic limits, id. art. 76; drilling for nonresource purposes, idL art. 81; pipelines, id art. 79; and artificial islands,
installations, and structures, the safety zones around them, and the duty to
remove them, idL arts. 60, 80. Insofar as the seabed of the continental
shelf is concerned, no other detailed regime set forth in the 1982 Convention (perhaps exduding that of the territorial sea) exhibits less textual preoccupation with interests other than those of the coastal state.
77. While article 63 of the Convention itself imposes on the coastal
state an obligation to conserve living resources of the exclusive economic
zone designed to serve both environmental and economic purposes, the
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A more liberal interpretation of this or any other lan-

guage dealing with such a duty is not only unlikely to be of
practical utility but could well compel some governments to

try to restrain the emergence or content of new international

standards. 78 Such interpretation could also provoke a seri79
ous attempt to render the provision superfluous.
coastal state is bound merely to take into account any generally recommended international minimum standards; it is not required to give effect
to them. The fact that the exclusive economic zone represents the culmination of a struggle to substitute coastal state regulation for international
regulation of fisheries may explain the weakness of this reference to international standards. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 63. Still,
this approach parallels the similar weakness of the duty only to take into
account international standards in connection with land-based and atmospheric sources of marine pollution. Id. art. 207, para. 1; id. art. 212, para.
1. It is not easy to reconcile the absence of an obligation to observe even
"generally accepted" international standards in the foregoing provisions
with an interpretation of article 208 pursuant to which the coastal state is
bound to comply with international standards for seabed activities off its
coast even if those standards are not generally accepted. Id. art. 208.
78. To the extent that it is not due to mere oversight at the outset and
lack of temerity thereafter, the difference in wording may well be due to
the fact that at the time the text was drafted in the Third Committee of the
Conference, there were no specific international standards in existence regarding environmental limitations on the development of continental shelf
resources as such, not to mention "generally accepted" ones. The Second
Committee faced the same problem, but did refer to generally accepted
international standards in connection with the removal of installations, the
breadth of safety zones around installations, and navigation in the vicinity
of installations and safety zones. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3,
art. 60. With respect to each of these matters, however, restraints on the
coastal state are not at issue. The Convention itself states a norm, and
leaves to "generally accepted international standards" (or, in the second
case, the recommendation of the competent international organization)
the question of exceptions or additions more favorable to the coastal state.
79. The argument would be that the absence of qualifying words like
"generally accepted" means one must refer to general principles of international law to determine which international environmental rules and
standards a state is legally bound to respect, and that these principles generally require either the agreement of the coastal state concerned or, in
the absence of such agreement, satisfaction of stringent conditions for
demonstrating that each technical rule has been absorbed into customary
international law. With respect to the difficulties of satisfying such conditions, see the discussion in Part II(B)(3) supra. Notably, apart from the
International Seabed Authority established by the Convention itself, in
only one case did the drafters of the Convention seek to impose regulations adopted by an international organization directly on all parties to the
Convention. The text of article 39(3)(a) refers to rules adopted by an or-
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In the case of ocean dumping, there was no incentive to
qualify the reference to "global standards." Only one relatively limited activity was involved, 0 a generally satisfactory
environmental regime for. that activity was already established by the Ocean Dumping Convention, 8 ' and no alternative or additional global regulatory regime8 2 regarding
ocean dumping was contemplated. Both parties and nonparties to the Ocean Dumping Convention seemed unconcerned about the procedure for imposing stricter requirements in the future within the framework of the Convention.
Should the need arise, it would not be difficult to interpret
"global" in much the same way one would interpret "generally accepted."
4. Protecting NavigationalRights
The above examples all involve the imposition of duties
on a state that otherwise has exclusive or primary authority
to authorize and regulate an activity. These are the examples that are particularly relevant to the underlying theme of
this Article.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea also employs similar techniques to deal with the tension that arises
when one state has safety or environmental competencies
over an activity that another state has the right to conduct or
ganization whose authority derives from what has long been one of the
most widely ratified regulatory treaties in the world: "Aircraft in transit
passage shall... observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft." Law of
the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 39, para. 3(a).
80. Because the text under consideration gave coastal states the right
to control dumping in broad areas off their coast, an attempt to qualify the
duty to repsect global standards could have been misinterpreted domestically as signalling an intent to pollute one's own waters in a manner that
exceeded international minimum requirements.
81. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, U.S.-U.K.U.S.S.R.-Mex., 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force
Aug. 30, 1975).
82. It might be noted that while paragraph 4 of article 210 provides for
the elaboration of both global and regional rules and standards, paragraph 6 requires that national laws and regulations are to be "no less cffective" than global rules. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art.
210.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LA W AND POLITICS

[Vol. 24:109

authorize. This is the problem posed by coastal state prescriptive or enforcement competence with respect to foreign
ships navigating off its coast.
Two difficulties arise. First, coastal state regulations
that differ from those of the flag state or other coastal states
may impose conflicting obligations on ships that are impossible to reconcile. Second, even where this is not the case, unlimited coastal state regulatory discretion could effectively
extinguish the underlying right to navigate without specific
coastal state consent, or impose undue burdens on the exercise of that right.
Denying the coastal state any competence would provide one solution. Another is to give the coastal state enforcement but not unilateral prescriptive competence by limiting its regulatory discretion to measures based upon generally accepted international standards.8 3
Thus, innocent passage in the territorial sea outside
straits is the only navigation regime subject to general
coastal state prescriptive competence regarding safety, pollution, and certain other matters.8 4 However, even here
competence "giv[es] effect to generally accepted international rules or standards" where the matter concerns "the
design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
ships."' 5 Coastal state prescriptive competence over pollution from foreign ships in the exclusive economic zone is
limited to laws and regulations "conforming to and giving
effect to generally accepted international rules and stan86
dards."
Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes proposed by
83. An interesting aspect of the balance thus achieved is that the
coastal state, in the first instance, may identify the international standards
that in its opinion are generally accepted.
84. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 21, para. 1; id. art.
211, para. 4; id. art. 220, para. 2.
85. Id. art. 21, para. 2. The same limitation applies to coastal state laws
and regulations in special areas within the exclusive economic zone. Id.
art. 211, para. 6. Those laws and regulations are also subject to agreement with the competent international organization. Id.
86. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 211, para. 5. As an
exception to this overall approach, the Convention accords general prescriptive and enforcement competence to the coastal state to control pollution from foreign ships in certain ice-covered areas. Id. art. 234.
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the coastal state in straits and archipelagos must "conform to
generally accepted international regulations" even though
each proposal also is subject to approval by the competent
international organization.8 7 A coastal state may not establish safety zones around its continental shelf installations exceeding 500 meters from the installation "except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as rec-s
ommended by the competent international organization."8
The duty to remove abandoned or disused installations8 9 in
order to avoid the accumulation of obstructions to navigation and other uses is newly qualified by what is in effect an

exception expanding coastal state options, namely the clause
"taking into account any generally accepted international
standards established in this regard by the competent inter-

national organization." 90
5.

Dispute Settlement

One of the most significant aspects of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is that it provides for compulsory
arbitration or adjudication of a wide variety of disputes that
are not settled by other means. 9 ' Although this obligation
generally does not apply to disputes "with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction," such conflicts are subject to compulsory arbitration or
adjudication in three situations relevant to the texts reviewed
92
above:
1) "when it is alleged that the coastal State has acted in contravention of the provisions of [the
U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea] in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation
".93

2) "when it is alleged that a State in exercising the

aforementioned freedoms [or] rights... has acted in contravention of [the] Convention or of
87. Id. art. 41, paras. 3, 4; i art. 53, paras. 8, 9.
88. Id., art. 60, para. 5; id at 35, art. 80.
89. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 5, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
90. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 60, para. 3.
91. Id art. 286.
92. Id. art. 297, para. 1.
93. Id art. 297(a), para 1.
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laws or regulations adopted by the coastal State
in conformity with this Convention .... ";94 or
3) "when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted
in contravention of specified international rules
and standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have been
established by [the] Convention or through a
competent international organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention." 9 5
While the scope of the third provision may be ambiguous, 96 it is clear that violations, both by the flag state of its
94. Id. art. 297(b), para. 1.
95. Id. art. 297(c), para. 1.
96. This provision is one of 21 in which the word "applicable" qualifies
a cross-reference to environmental standards which a state or person is
obliged to respect or entitled to enforce under the Convention. It was to
have been expected, and can now be documented, that certain commentators would hasten to interpret "applicable" in a manner that renders the
relevant provision useless and superfluous (notwithstanding general principles of interpretation that counsel us to try to avoid such results). Those
commentators can do this neatly and even coyly by interpreting "applicable" to mean "otherwise legally in force" for the state concerned, thus
negating the very idea that a state is legally bound or entitled by virtue of
the Convention alone to respect or enforce an "applicable" standard unless another clause of the Convention (that does not use the word "applicable") so provides.
The text of article 297(1) of the Convention seems to suggest a resolution of the problem even under the interpretive approach indicated
above. The paragraph as a whole applies only to "[d]isputes concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention." It would be normal
to interpret language in such a compromissory clause with reference to
substantive provisions of the same instrument. Unless "applicable" is
read here as a cross-reference to the substantive provisions of the Convention rather than some other agreement, how does a dispute alleging failure to comply with an "applicable" standard "established... through a
competent international organization or diplomatic conference" qualify as
a dispute "concerning the interpretation or application of [the] Convention?"
For purposes of article 297, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
international standards "applicable" to a coastal state are those that the
Convention requires such standards to respect. Since all three of the basic
coastal state obligations to apply international environmental standards
under Part XII of the Convention (arts. 208(3), 210(6) and 211(2)) are
phrased in the form of a duty to adopt laws and regulations that have the
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duties to apply generally accepted international environmental standards regarding navigation safety and pollution from
ships and by the coastal state of its duties not to prescribe or
enforce standards that are not generally accepted with respect to foreign ships, are subject to compulsory arbitration
or adjudication under the first two paragraphs. The clause
thus enhances the coastal state's confidence in a flag state's
duty to respect generally accepted international standards in
place of broader coastal state prescriptive or enforcement
competencies. It further heightens the flag state's ability to
share with coastal states the enforcement of generally accepted international standards. It also opens the door to the
development of a jurisprudence of detailed environmental
obligations rooted in the concept of the generally accepted
standard.
IV.

WHERE IS IT USEFUL TO INCORPORATE THE

DUTY?

If a treaty itself establishes the standards necessary to
achieve the underlying objectives, there is no need to include
a duty to respect generally accepted standards.9 7 Similarly, if
the treaty establishes a regulatory organ or other mechanism
for future elaboration of the binding standards necessary to
same effect as, or are no less effective than, the international standards,
one must regard these as creating legal obligations for purposes of dispute
settlement if the compromissory clause is to have any content. On the
other hand, a coastal state could not be sued for "contravention" of a standard that the Convention merely obliges it to take into account.
Coastal state contravention of an international environmental standard that the Convention authorizes (but does not require) it to enforce
against foreign ships would normally be challenged on the ground that it
is a contravention of the provisions of the Convention with respect to freedoms and rights of navigation. Nevertheless, it is possible that the coastal
state is also subject to suit in such a case on the ground that it acted in
contravention of an applicable international environmental standard. Set
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3.
97. In theory, the duty could be used in this situation to fill substantive
gaps, much as general cross-references to international law may be used to
fill such gaps in so-called law-making treaties and similar instruments.
The duty to respect generally accepted standards bears a certain resemblance to the more general legal technique of incorporation by reference. The difference is that incorporation by reference is normally associated with a reasonably precise identification of the texts incorporated. A
treaty that, by reference, incorporates precisely identified, existing standards, is in fact a variant of the type of treaty described in the above text.
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achieve the underlying objectives, there is no need
to include
98
a duty to respect generally accepted standards.
It may be useful to incorporate a duty to respect generally accepted standards in treaties establishing general regimes, especially in what are sometimes called "framework"
treaties. Two historical examples are the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas and, with one exception, 99 the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. They suggest that the
duty is used where there is a perceived need to require or
authorize states to apply detailed technical international
standards, accompanied by a reluctance to articulate or specify the precise standards.
That reluctance may be due to a variety of factors. Participants may lack specific technical expertise or may wish to
minimize the time or potential for disagreement involved in
dealing with the matter. Members of the secretariat may
counsel against duplication of effort with other international
organizations or fora. "Freezing" detailed technical standards in a treaty that is difficult to amend may be ill-conceived. There is a risk of omission in too precise an articulation. Inconsistent obligations could emerge from renegotiation or amendment of relevant texts in the treaty being
drafted or the instrument from which those texts are drawn.
It may be desirable to provide for the incorporation by reference of changes and new standards that are developed in the
future in response to experience and new information.
While the duty is normally articulated where some stan00
dards are already in existence, this need not be the case.'

98. In theory, there is a role for such a duty to the extent that the regulatory organ is accorded only recommendatory powers. In practice, the
simultaneous negotiation of the constituent instrument and the duty to
respect recommendations of the proposed organization that are "generally accepted" might prove awkward.
99. Part XI and its annexes would establish a highly detailed regulatory
system for deep seabed mining.
100. Article 208, paragraph 3, of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea set forth a duty to respect international environmental standards regarding activities on the continental shelf at a time when all or virtually all
such standards remained to be established by the competent international
organization.
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V.

UTILrrY OF THE

DUTy

The utility of a duty to respect generally accepted international standards should be measured against underlying
regulatory goals. Objectives identified for purposes of this
study are universality, regulatory precision, adaptability to
change, and a legal obligation to comply.
The duty achieves nothing in the absence of particular
standards, and the goal of adaptability is dependent on the
existence of a source to generate new or revised standards.
Thus, the utility of the duty should not be measured as an
alternative to treaties establishing particular standards or international regulatory organizations authorized to do so, but
as a complement to such measures.
A.

Universality

The duty does not automatically produce universal respect for a particular standard. The standard's pedigree
should be international, preferably a multilateral organization or conference. The standard must be generally accepted. That general acceptance is most likely to emerge
from a combination of ratification or formal acceptance by
some states of the treaty or instrument containing the standard, implementation of the standard by other states, and
respect for the standard by individuals and companies whose
activities are its ultimate object.
Once a particular standard becomes "generally accepted," the gap is closed by the duty and the standard binds
everyone. This is true even if the organization that adopted
the standard does not have universal membership, the standard was adopted by a divided vote, the resolution that articulates the standard is not legally binding, or the treaty in
which the standard is incorporated is not generally accepted
or even in force.' 0 '
In order for this to occur, states must be bound by a
duty to respect generally accepted international standards of
101. To the extent that support for adoption of a standard by an inter-

national organization or conference is itself widespread and represencative, induding states that are specially affected, the chances for its general
acceptance are enhanced. However, it is the subsequent general acceptance of the standard, not the standard's pedigree, that controls.
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a particular type. This duty will normally arise from the text

of a treaty designed to establish
a widely ratified global re10 2
gime in a particular field.
In situations where states are prepared to be bound to
respect at least some international standards that they have

not affirmatively accepted, inclusion of the duty may facilitate rather than impair negotiation and ratification. Delegates are spared the task of negotiating specific standards,
which carry with them the risk that some detail or other
could obstruct ratification in one or another state. Negotiators can avoid the complex problem and risks to ratification

posed by a decision regarding what type of majority will bind

all parties to a standard.' 0 3 The mere fact of adoption of a
standard by an international organization or conference does

not make it binding on a party to the "framework treaty."
10 4

Only subsequent general acceptance triggers a legal duty.
It is easier to argue either that a duty to respect generally accepted international standards has become customary

international law from a "law-making" or "framework"

treaty' 0 5 than it is to argue that specific technical standards
102. With respect to incorporation of the duty into customary international law, see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
103. This problem is discussed in greater detail in Part II(B)(2) supra.
104. The scope of the duty is examined in Part VI infra.
105. The provenance of the concept adds plausibility to such an argument. The Convention on the High Seas states in its preamble that it was
intended to be a codification of international law. See supra Part III(A)(1).
Deep seabed mining apart, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea is
now widely regarded as generally declaratory of international law.
Section 603 of the Third Restatement deduces from the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea that a "state is obligated... to adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce, and control any significant pollution of the
marine environment that are no less effective than generally accepted international rules and standards." RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 603 and
Source Note. A duty to conform to generally accepted international rules
and standards "is adopted from the law of the sea" and extended by section 601 to apply, beyond pollution of the marine environment, more
broadly to "injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction," but only "to the extent practicable
under the circumstances." Id. § 601 and Comment b. No specific authority apart from the law of the sea is cited for the extension in section 601.
The "practicability" qualification introduced in section 601 not only implies some hesitation but is arguably inconsistent with the objective of uniformity historically associated with the duty. The textual difference between sections 601 and 603 suggests that the incorporation into custom-
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have become part of customary law as such10 6 or that a nonparty is bound to accept the regulatory authority of an international organization. The duty resembles a norm. The requirement that standards are generally accepted resonates
with the familiar harmonies of state practice. States seeking
to avoid an obligation are more likely to squeal about particular standards than to thunder their defiance of the norm.
B.

Precision

The duty assumes the independent existence of international standards or means for generating such standards.
The standards incorporated by the duty may be drafted with
any level of precision. Because "general acceptance" rather
than the procedure by which the standard is drafted and
adopted is the test for creating a legal obligation, the standard can be drafted by technical experts, and does not need
be included in an instrument subject to ratification.
C. Adaptability
It is perhaps in the area of adaptability that the duty has
its greatest utility. It incorporates new standards as they become generally accepted. In the fields of safety and environmental protection, changes in municipal laws and regulations and the practice of individuals and companies may well
outpace the formal processes of treaty ratification or approval of binding international regulations. New standards
and refinements may become generally accepted before they
otherwise become legally binding on a large number of
states.
D.

Legal Obligation

The duty entails a legally binding obligation to observe
generally accepted standards. This obligation, however, is
created by general acceptance of a standard in fact, rather
than by the procedure by which the standard was articulated.
ary law of an unqualified duty to respect generally accepted international
standards is most likely to occur when it arises directly out of a law-making" or "framework" treaty that expressly applies the duty to the specific
fields and activities in question.
106. See supra II(B)(3).
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Thus, it creates a useful bridge between so-called "soft law"
and "hard law." This, indeed, was part of its original function.107 Where appropriate, standards (or guidelines) can be
developed in a somewhat more relaxed procedural environment which is not specifically designed to generate legally
binding obligations as such; yet those same standards can
become legally binding if they become generally accepted.
VI.

SCOPE OF THE

DUTY

The effect of the duty under discussion is to impose a
legal obligation on a state to respect a standard which it
would not otherwise be legally bound to respect. The consensual requirements of international law for the imposition
of legal obligations are not offended by this proposition;
those requirements have previously been satisfied through
acceptance of the general duty either by treaty or by customary international law. It is unnecessary to restrict the scope
of the duty itself to conform to such requirements.
At the same time, the fact that the duty, once in effect
operates in derogation of the normal consensual requirements of international law must be borne in mind when considering its scope. Neither its text nor its history suggests
the substitution of legislative mandates for consensual
norms. The failure to address questions of legislative competence and procedure belies such a broad interpretation.
The interpretation of the scope of the duty unquestionably affects the utility of the concept. That interpretation
should be informed by and should further the purposes for
employing such a duty. If the concept is to prove useful in
the future, lawyers must approach it with the same care and
deference with which they approach other legal tools. The
meaning of those tools may be adapted to particular instruments or contexts in which they are used,' 08 but the central
107. See supra Part III(A)(1).
108. The precise language used in phrasing the duty is of course the
point of departure. For example, the word "international" is normally included to describe the standards to which reference is made. When that
word is used in conjunction with the express requirement that the standards be "generally accepted," it may be reasonable to interpret the word
"international" broadly to mean some respectable international pedigree.
If the word "international" is used without the additional term "generally
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idea should be described with deference to both present and
future utility. 109
accepted," it may be necessary to interpret the word far more restrictively
in order to render the underlying duty plausible. See supra Part HI(B)(3).
In some cases, the duty is also limited to standards emanating from a
forum such as "the competent international organization." In such cases,
even if the word "international" were interpreted broadly, the reference
to a specific pedigree such as "the competent international organization"
would limit the scope of the duty so qualified.
In other cases, differences in language are less crucial. For example,
while this article uses the word "standards" as a convenient catch-all reference, the relevant treaty texts may instead or in addition refer to rules,
regulations, practices, procedures, etc. The U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea reveals a wide variety of permutations in this regard. It is not
clear that these terms were or should be regarded as alternatives and, if so,
whether it makes much difference. Today, most relevant standards are
likely to be manifested in the "regulatory" work ofan international organization.
109. The scope of the duty to respect generally accepted international
standards, and in particular the meaning of the key term "generally accepted," have been the subject of interesting scholarly comment. While
relevant to the future utility of the duty in other instruments, the comments generally were not made in that context, and the commentators had
little if any occasion to consider some of the teleological factors that influence this article. Comments may be found, inter alia, in the following
works:
J. Peter A. Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of 1essel-Source Pollution: Pre.
scriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference, 20 VA.J. INtL
L. 265 (1980); Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollutionunder the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J. Im'L L. 347 (1985); Hugo Caminos, The Legal Rigime of
Straits in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 205 REc.
CouRs 150-53, 164-69 (1987); R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAw OF
THE SEA 73-74, 85, 184-93, 225-49 (1983); Paul S. Dempsey, Compliance
and Enforcement in InternationalLaw - Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment
by Ocean Vessels, 6 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 542-45 (1984); Kari Hakapaa,
MARINE PoLLUrION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 188-22 (1981); B. Kwu'row-

sKA, supra note 75, at 120-23, 160-97 (1989) (original source for an
number of other sources cited herein); T.L. McDoRMAN Er At-, THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND THE CARACAS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TIlE
SEA 38-40 (1981); 4 MYRON H. NORDQUIST, SHABTAi ROSENNE & ALEXANDER YANKOV,UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. 1982,

COMMENTARY (1991) (artide-by-article history and commentary); Ebere
Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 AM. J. IT'rL L
604, 619-21 (1979);Jan Schneider, Codification and ProgressiveDevdopment of
InternationalEnvironmental Law at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: The Environmental Aspects of the Treat, Review, 20 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1981); Louis B. Sohn, Implications of the Law of the Sea
Convention Regarding the Protection and Preservationof the Marine Environment,

A

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LA W AND POLITICS

[Vol. 24:109

To achieve the objective of universality, at least three
things must be promoted: universal acceptance of the duty
to respect particular types of standards (generally enhanced
by a strict construction of the duty); universal respect for
particular standards (generally enhanced by a liberal construction of the duty); and negotiation and promulgation of
the precise standards (which could be restrained by concerns
about a liberally construed duty). A useful interpretation of
the scope of the duty must balance these three sometimes
conflicting goals. Whether strict or liberal, too precise an interpretation not only threatens that balance but deprives the
concept of its central virtue: that quality prized by diplomats
and politicians as flexibility and scorned by lawyers and academics as ambiguity.1 1 0
The lawyer is tempted to draw analogies between the
process by which an international standard becomes generally accepted and the more familiar (if no less elusive) process by which a new rule contained in a treaty or other instrument adopted by an international organization or conference becomes customary international law. Since the
juridical result is conceptually the same-a state is bound by
a rule notwithstanding its failure affirmatively to accept that
rule-one is tempted to conclude that the requirements for
achieving that result are the same.
There are important differences between the two concepts that suggest caution in making too facile an analogy.
The most obvious is that a generally accepted international
standard is not the same as a rule of customary international
law. If it were, there would be no need for the duty to respect generally accepted standards: the jurists who develin LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 103 (1985); 2 G.J. TIMAGENIS, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION 605-07 (1980); W. van Reenen, Rules of
Reference in the New Convention on the Law of the Sea, in Particularin Connection
with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from Tankers, 12 NETH. Y.B. INr'L L. 3
(1981) (elaborate development of question); Mario Valenzuela, IMO: Public InternationalLaw and Regulation, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN INDUSTRY: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND RESTRAINTS

141 (Douglas M. Johnston

& Norman G. Letalik eds. 1984); Daniel Vignes, La Valeur Juridique de
CertainesRgles, Normes ou PratiquesMentionnes au TNCO comme "Gniralement
Accepte6s", 25 ANN. FR. DR. INT. 712 (1979) (theoretical framework).
110. To appropriate and extend a finely wrought insight taught by Elliot
Richardson: ideas, like people, have the defects of their virtues.
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oped the concept and those who have used it could have resorted to the more familiar drafting technique of a cross-reference to international law.
Assuming, arguendo, that the amount of international acceptance necessary to conclude that a standard is "generally
accepted" is analogous to the amount of acceptance required
to establish state practice with respect to a new rule of customary international law, other important differences remain. The difficulties involved in establishing that technical
standards satisfy the norm-creating, opiniojuris and other requirements for a rule of customary law have already been explored."' Neither text nor policy suggests the imposition of
these kinds of restrictions on the12duty to respect generally
accepted international standards.
The problem of the "persistent objector" is a more
complicated one. The goal of uniformity and the idea of allowing an exception for the persistent objector are in tension. There is no a priori requirement that such a limitation
on the application of a new rule of customary international
law be incorporated into the duty to respect generally accepted international standards.
The fundamental question is whether the underlying
purpose of the duty to respect generally accepted international standards is to deal only with the passive straggler or
also with the active dissenter. In some cases, the nature of
the system that produced the standard may also influence
the answer.113 Generally, one must weigh the benefits, if
111. See supra Part II(B)(3).
112. For example, it is often necessary to give states a right to "opt out"
of regulations or technical amendments in order to persuade them to accept a treaty delegating authority to a qualified majority of states to adopt
regulations or amendments binding all parties. If a right to "opt Out"
were regarded as having the same effect on the duty to respect generally
accepted standards as the express right to reserve to a particular treaty
provision has in determining whether the provision partakes of a fundamental norm-creating character necessary for its absorption into customary law, many useful and very widely implemented standards could be exduded from the duty to respect generally accepted international standards. See North Sea Continental She/f cases, supra note 15, para. 72.
113. For example, treaties that establish expedited systems for adopting
regulations or technical amendments binding all parties may give the par-

ties a right to "opt out," at least if they act in a timely fashion. Should the
same right be accorded non-parties if they act in a timely fashion, that is
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any, from invoking the duty with respect to an active dissenter against the possible cost of making states more reluctant to accept such a duty in the future. It should be borne
in mind that at some point active dissent contradicts the underlying assertion that a standard is generally accepted. Prudence would counsel gaining more experience in dealing
with passive stragglers before considering the extent to
which the duty provides a useful solution to the more challenging problem of active dissenters.
A.

What is a Standard?

Little attention is ordinarily devoted to the meaning of
the word "standard," or for that matter "rule," "regulation,"
"procedure," or "practice," in analyzing the scope of
the
duty to respect generally accepted international standards.
Yet, upon reflection, it would appear that many provisions of
instruments adopted by international organizations or diplomatic conferences would not be relevant to the duty, even if
the instruments were very widely accepted.
The duty to respect international standards is typically
expressed in connection with a duty (or right) to adopt national laws and regulations governing a particular matter.
While a provision need not have a fundamental norm-creating character 1 4 to be regarded as a standard, it should inform the precise content of those national laws and regulations.
The purpose of the duty is to establish uniform practice.
Myriad clauses such as "States shall cooperate to . . ." or
"States shall take into account ... " or "States shall endeavor
to..." normally do not introduce precise rules of conduct to
be observed and enforced uniformly even by states legally
bound by the specific instrument in which they appear. If the
goal of uniform practice cannot be deduced from the nature,
language, or history of a provision, it may not be regarded as
(by analogy to the customary law rule) before the standard is generally
accepted? Or does such an argument miss the point that two different
sources of obligation are involved, and that both parties and non-parties
to the regulatory instrument are bound by a standard once it is generally
accepted, independently of the provisions of that instrument?
114. See supra notes 16, 19 and accompanying text.
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establishing a global "standard" of conduct.' 15
B.

Where Does One Find "Acceptance"?

The requirement that standards be "generally accepted" lies at the heart of the inquiry. Two questions may
be posed: 1) where does one look to find "acceptance"?;
and 2) how much acceptance is required?
One can look to three possible sources to determine
whether a standard has been accepted: events at the organization or conference that adopted the standard; the practice
of governments, reflected in ratification of treaties, national
laws and regulations, and authoritative statements of policy;
and the practice of individuals and companies whose activities are the object of a particular standard. The question is
whether, and to what extent, each should be considered in
deciding if the requirement that a standard be generally accepted has been satisfied.
1. Circumstances of Promulgation
Events at the organization or conference that adopted
the standard, while not entirely irrelevant, should not be accorded significant weight in determining whether a standard
is generally accepted. There are important reasons for
reaching this conclusion with respect to both negative and
positive inferences.
a. Negative Inferences
A standard, particularly one that was ahead of its time,
may have been adopted by a divided vote reflecting controversy and hesitation. This controversy and hesitation may
thereafter gradually subside. If the standard becomes sufficiently widely accepted in practice, the fact that it was controversial when adopted should not necessarily prevent it
from being regarded as "generally accepted."
The same may be true of a decision to articulate the
standard as a non-binding recommendation rather than as
part of an instrument intended to create a legally binding
obligation. In some cases, the decision to articulate the standard as a recommendation may reflect an intent to promote
115. See infra note 116.
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widespread uniform practice by encouraging all states to implement the standard directly without the intermediation of
a binding international legal instrument. That could be a
more expeditious approach where governments already have
regulatory authority to implement the standard without the
need to seek additional legislation from their parliaments,
and the domestic agencies to which such authority is delegated are prominently represented in the international discussions. If such a standard thereafter comes to be sufficiently widely accepted in practice, the fact that it was
promulgated in non-binding form should not necessarily
prevent it from being regarded as "generally accepted."' 16
b.

Positive Inferences

Absent specific agreement to the contrary, states are not
deemed to have "accepted" new rules by the votes they cast
in international organizations or at diplomatic conferences
or even by their signature of agreements subject to ratification or acceptance. 17 There is no reason to construe the
reference to "generally accepted" standards any differently
insofar as it relates to events at such organizations and conferences. It cannot be maintained that the purpose of establishing a duty to respect generally accepted international
standards is to confer legislative power on an international
organization or conference. To the contrary, the duty is an
attempt to provide a solution to the problem posed by the
absence of an organization with the power to prescribe standards that are universally binding.
The affirmative votes of a large number, or even all dele116. In other cases the decision to promulgate a "standard" as a recommendation may reflect a view that the "standard" is not expected to be
widely implemented, or that it is essentially optional in nature and uniform
practice is not being sought. If the "standard" proved widely influential,
the circumstances of its adoption might be of some relevance in determining whether, or more probably when, it is an appropriate object of the
duty to respect generally accepted standards. The language of the resolution may help in this regard. A chapeau such as, "Governments are encouraged to consider the desirability of" adopting the recommended approach "in whole or in part" seems quite weak. The question then is
whether we are dealing with something that is properly regarded as a
"standard" or a "rule" or a "regulation" at all, even if itcomes to be generally accepted. The response may well be, "No."
117. See Vienna Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1(b), 9, 11, 12, 14(2).
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gations in an organization, should be accorded legislative effect only if the constituent instrument of the organization so
provides,1 1 8 and only with respect to the parties to that instrument in accordance with the procedures specified
therein. 1 9 A general duty set forth in a one-sentence text
that does not necessarily identify the organization promulgating the relevant standards, and that says nothing about
decision-making and entry into force procedures, cannot
plausibly be converted into a grant of quasi-legislative power
by a deft interpretation of "generally accepted" that relies
on votes in the organization that "adopts" the standard.
A significant virtue of the duty to respect generally accepted international standards is that it can be adopted in a
framework treaty without elaborate negotiations on the voting procedures of the organizations that promulgate standards. That virtue would be lost if the duty were interpreted
by reference to votes in international organizations. Moreover, the duty can perform the function of promoting the
universality of standards only if the duty itself is universally
accepted. That is much less likely if the duty is interpreted to
confer legislative power on international organizations that
otherwise lack such power over the states concerned.
One must also consider the impact on international organizations and diplomatic conferences, and their capacity to
generate new and revised standards. The flexibility of delegations would likely be substantially curtailed if governments
118. The "competent international organization" that has the most frequent role in enunciating standards applicable to vessels is the International Maritime Organization. It has no legislative power over its members. The dosest it comes are some procedures for expedited "tacit
amendments" of technical annexes to treaties. See International Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
Oct. 20, 1972, art. 6, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 38 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force
July 15, 1977); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, art. 16, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (entered into force Oct.
2, 1983).
119. The question of the impact on customary law of the adoption of socalled law-making conventions and declarations of legal principles is distinct from the issue posed here. Most of the standards involved here are
not likely to emerge from considered judgments about what international
law requires or should require. They are more likely to reflect technical
judgments about specific restraints on private activities that should be incorporated into national laws and regulations.
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were concerned that a vote in the organization, in and of itself, might be a substantial factor in determining whether all
states were subject to new, legally binding obligations,
notwithstanding the fact that the vote, as a formal matter,
concerned only a nonbinding resolution or the text of a
treaty subject to ratification.
In brief, according significant effect to events at the organization or conference that adopted the standard would be
inconsistent with the purposes of the duty to respect generally accepted international standards and would frustrate
their realization. Such an approach misinterprets what governments thought they were doing in adopting the duty in
the past, and would discourage governments from adopting
the duty in the future.
2.

Practiceof Governments

The adoption and enforcement of a standard by national
governments are the central factors in assessing general acceptance. A state may adopt a standard by national legislation, national regulations, authoritative policy statements or
by becoming party to a treaty articulating the standard. The
question is not whether a treaty articulating the standard is
widely ratified, or even in force.1 20 The question is whether
the standard has been adopted by one of several possible
means.
The goal of the duty is uniformity of practice. To establish acceptance of the standard in fact, one may need to verify enforcement and compliance. Mere formal or rhetorical
adoption of the standard by some states should not be sufficient to establish a duty to respect and apply the standard by
others. In the case of mere formal or rhetorical adoption,
there would be no uniformity of practice essential to the
achievement of the safety or environmental objective involved, even without regard to the states that have not
adopted the standard. In economic terms, those states can120. The fact that a treaty articulating the standard is not in force would
be significant if assent to the treaty were the only manifestation of acceptance of the standard by certain states. If, on the other hand, those states
had also implemented the standard prior to the entry into force of the
treaty, then the fact the treaty is not in force may well be irrelevant for
purposes of determining whether they have "accepted" the standard.
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not fairly be characterized as "free riders" if many others are
in fact not observing the standard.
3.

Practiceof Individuals and Companies Whose Activities are the
Object of a ParticularStandard

The duty to respect generally accepted international
standards is usually articulated as a qualification of the
broader duty of states to adopt laws and regulations governing certain activities of persons subject to their jurisdiction. Restraining the conduct of individuals and companies
is the object of the provisions; imposing duties of enforcement on states is the means.
If uniform observance of a standard is the goal, then it is
the behavior of the individuals and companies concerned
that will truly determine the degree to which that goal has
been achieved. For this reason alone, it is not unreasonable
to consider whether behavior of such individuals and companies may shed some light on the question of whether a standard has been generally accepted. Both negative and positive inferences are possible.
a. Negative Inferences
The mere existence of non-compliance by individuals in
itself does not suggest that a standard is not generally accepted. Indeed, the identification of violators may be an important step in vigorous government enforcement. At some
point, however, widespread non-compliance by significant
numbers of individuals who are the ultimate object of the
standard suggests that the standard is not generally accepted
in fact.
b.

Positive Inferences

The idea of practice by individuals and companies generating international obligations among states is unlikely to
have much appeal in government circles. The question of
drawing positive inferences from such practice therefore
must be approached with circumspection.
One should recognize that the question is not whether
the practice of individuals and companies can create obligations for the state of which they are a national against its will.
The question is whether their voluntary compliance with an
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international standard, with the express or tacit approval of
their own government, can be taken into account in determining whether there is general acceptance of the standard
for purposes of securing compliance by nationals of some
other state. To put it differently, must states require their
willing nationals to comply before they, or more importantly,
other states that require compliance may enjoy protections
against non-compliance by third states?
In some situations, one can imagine the rapid implementation of a newly promulgated international standard by
the individuals and companies whose conduct is the ultimate
object of regulation. This may occur well in advance of (and
sometimes obviating a practical need for) governmental regulation in some states. Reasons might include a concern for
safety, political pressure, public relations, a fear of civil liability, or responsible citizenship. The result might be a level
of governmental practice that taken alone would be insufficient to establish general acceptance, but that would cross
that threshold if the behavior of a world-wide industry as a
whole, including nationals of most other states, were taken
into account.
The objective desirability of concluding that the combination of state and private practice is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of general acceptance is most evident with respect to a standard that might be characterized as a generally
accepted "rule of the road,"'1 21 but it need not be so limited.
The burden of the economic "free rider," which the duty is
in part designed to suppress, may well be felt more keenly by
responsible private actors complying with a standard than by
governments themselves.
In some cases, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for
purposes of establishing the duty of another state to respect
an international standard, states may be relieved of the need
to demonstrate general acceptance by government behavior
alone if the nationals of some states that have not affirma121. One might imagine a situation in which some governments, and
virtually all ships, implement an international rule calling for the installation of a green light on the starboard side of a ship and a red light on the
port side in order to help prevent collisions. That is precisely the kind of
situation Gidel and Hudson had in mind when they initiated consideration
of the problem that led to the adoption of article 10 of the Convention on
the High Seas. See supra note 25.
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tively adopted the standard have voluntarily and uniformly
implemented the standard with the express or tacit approval
of their governments.
Some may prefer to regard this as a situation in which
private behavior is not relevant as such to the question of
general acceptance, but is a means for establishing that particular states have accepted a standard in fact, albeit not in
form. Having concluded that the absence of acceptance in
fact should prevail over mere formal or rhetorical acceptance
in determining whether a standard is "generally accepted,"
we might reasonably conclude that acceptance in fact should
prevail over the absence of mere formal or rhetorical acceptance.
C. How Much Acceptance is Required?

In developing the first articulation of the duty to respect
generally accepted international standards, the International
Law Commission was in the end unable to choose between a
quantitative and a functional description of the degree of acceptance necessary in order for the duty to arise.' 2 2 The
specific functional choices before it were a majority of maritime states, a majority of sea-going vessels, or vessels forming the greater part of the tonnage of sea-going ships. A
proposal to refer to a majority of members of the United Nations encountered fierce opposition. The Commission
wound up proposing "internationally accepted standards."
Those favoring a numerical formula feared investing the
principal maritime powers with legislative authority. Those
favoring a functional formula feared investing a numerical
majority with authority in a field where experience and interest were unevenly distributed. According to the record, the
International Law Commission did not consider a combination of numerical and functional requirements. The "generally accepted" criterion, originally proposed by Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice to the Commission as a more flexible substitute
for a reference to standards "fixed by international agreement," became the solution adopted at the 1958 Conference
to the question of the requisite majority.
It is fair to say that the solution worked. The govern122. See supra notes 21-56 and accompanying text.
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ment representatives at the 1958 Conference, and during a
decade of negotiations on the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, expressed no objection to the "generally accepted" criterion, even as use of the language was greatly
expanded.
One reason for the lack of objection may be fairly widespread understanding of the nature and origin of the standards. In 1958, the safety standards being incorporated
were rather well known. By the 1970s, maritime countries
had become quite comfortable with the organization and
work of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.1 2 3 That organization was one of the first to
adopt an active and productive environmental agenda. It
was expected to be the source for most, if not all, of the international safety and environmental standards referred to in
the 1982 Convention.
Another reason is that, at the Third U.N. Conference,
the duty to conform to generally accepted standards became
a positive alternative to unilateral coastal state competence
to prescribe and enforce pollution or safety regulations for
foreign ships navigating off the coast. That alternative could
have been undermined if maritime states had sought to restrict or even discuss the scope of the duty.
A further factor relates to the difficulty of predicting in
the abstract whether national interests will be served by a
strict or liberal interpretation of the duty. The duty
originated in an effort to protect the safety of the principal
maritime fleets. Its expansion to environmental matters reflects a preoccupation with environmental protection that is
particularly widespread in industrialized countries. Its use as
a restriction on coastal state competence may suggest that it
is better to allow coastal states some flexibility in determining which international standards are generally accepted
than to risk collapse of the rule that coastal state competence
is generally limited to enforcing international standards.
Even for states normally fearful of "majority rule," the
scope of the risk here is unclear. Virtually all governments
are in fact more cautious about what standards they will im123. This is symbolized by their willingness to remove the word "con-

sultative" from its title, so that it is now called the International Maritime
Organization.
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plement than about how they vote in a global multilateral
forum. To the extent that the duty to respect generally accepted standards arises out of the actual laws, regulations,
and enforcement activities of governments, rather than their
rhetorical positions, the risk of being bound by seriously inconvenient standards may not be substantial.
Where does this leave the lawyer charged with interpretation? If the question is, what precisely is the numerical requirement, no a priori answer is possible, at least at this
time. If the question is what factors are relevant to the determination that a standard is generally accepted, one may suggest that both quantitative and functional majorities are important.
This conclusion is supported by analogy to requirements for a new rule of customary international law: "State
practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked."' 124 Where a
conventional rule is involved, "very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itthat of States whose interests were
self, provided it included
1 25
affected."
specially
It is also supported by the practice of international organizations and the requirements for the entry into force of
new or amended technical rules in regulatory treaties. Many
of these specifically require the affirmative participation of at
least a representative number of specially affected states.
Where these formal requirements do not exist, one will frearrangements designed to achieve the
quently find informal
26
same result.1
It is further supported by the purpose of the duty. Unless most activities that are the ultimate object of a standard
are already subject to the standard, the goal of uniformity
will not be achieved by requiring the remaining states to impose the standard on its nationals. The duty exists to dose
gaps, not to impose a legislative system. If the intent were to
124. See North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, supra note 15, para. 74.
125. Id. para. 73.
126. These arrangements might include a preference for making decisions by consensus or the establishment of subsidiary bodies with limited
and more interest-oriented membership.
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impose a legislative system, "specially affected states" almost
certainly would have demanded and received a special
27

voice. 1

Finally, it is not plausible to assume that specially affected states would respect a system that ignored their experience and interests. It is as unrealistic to assume that the
principal maritime and trading states can be ignored with respect to standards for ships as it would be to assume that the
principal producers and consumers of offshore petroleum
can be ignored with respect to standards for oil drilling on
the continental shelf. The real question is whether the state
with respect to which one would invoke the duty to enforce a
standard could plausibly be regarded in context as a mere
"straggler." If the answer is "no," an attempt to invoke the
duty to observe generally accepted standards is likely to do
little good in that case and much harm to the continued utility of the duty itself.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The duty to respect generally accepted international
standards appears in two consecutive conventions setting
forth the basic rules of the international law of the sea. It is
used to require uniform adherence to "rules of the road"
and safety practices, to establish a minimum level of regulation for purposes of environmental protection, and to restrain the regulatory competence of the coastal state with respect to ships exercising recognized navigation rights and
freedoms.
As these examples indicate, it is a tool that is particularly
well-suited to general "law-making" or "framework" treaties
that do not themselves contain or establish a system for de127. It should be recalled that all of the texts proposed by the Interna-

tional Law Commission that identified a specific majority were phrased in
functional terms, the most liberal being a majority of "maritime" states.
Moreoever, the strong initial support for expanding the duty to respect
generally accepted standards in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea came from European Community states with respect to safety matters,
and from the United States with respect to environmental protection.
None of these states is likely to have regarded its proposal as entailing a
duty to accept what a numerical majority of states had accepted without
regard to the position of states with proportionately greater interests at
stake.
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tailed international regulation, but whose objectives are furthered by regulatory uniformity. It would therefore seem to
be particularly well-suited to certain types of environmental
"framework" treaties, both global and regional.
The practical utility of the duty has not been tested.
Like many legal duties, it will function best where its existence encourages voluntary compliance, perhaps with a gentle reminder from outsiders. It needs to grow slowly.
It also needs to be nurtured. That requires avoiding restrictive interpretations that prejudice its utility in both existing and future treaties. That also requires avoiding liberal
interpretations that prejudice its acceptability as a useful
tool. The tool is a modest one. Unless it is so described,
treated, and interpreted, it is likely to prove useless. Some
governments easily could be provoked by liberal interpretations to resort to both restrictive interpretations and opposition to the use of the tool in future instruments. Coastal
states easily could be provoked by restrictive interpretations
into denouncing the very idea that their prescriptive competence over navigation off their coasts is often limited to enforcing generally accepted international standards.
There is then a certain irony in this study. Like the parent whose ultimate rejoinder is, "Do as I say, not as I do,"
perhaps the author's most significant conclusion is, "The
less said, the better."
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